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To explain the shadow economy in the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, this paper
evaluates the relationship between the shadow economy and tax morale. Viewing tax morale as
a measure of the symmetry between the codiﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions
(state morality) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (civic
morality), the proposition is that the lower the tax morale (i.e. the greater the asymmetry
between state morality and civic morality), the greater is the likelihood to participate in the
shadow economy. To evaluate this, a 2013 survey is reported involving 3036 face-to-face
interviews in these 3 Baltic nations. Using logistic regression analysis, the ﬁnding is that the
likelihood of participating in the shadow economy is greater, the lower is the tax morality of
individuals, population groups and countries. In addition, the likelihood to participate is
shadow economy is found to signiﬁcantly vary by, for example, gender, employment status
and country, people living in Latvia and Lithuania displaying signiﬁcantly lower likelihood
to engage in the shadow economy. The paper then explores the implications for theorizing
and tackling the shadow economy.
Keywords: informal economy; undeclared work; tax morale; social contract; institutional
analysis; Baltics
JEL classiﬁcation: E26; H26; J46; O17
Introduction
In recent years, numerous studies have revealed that the shadow economy is not some minor per-
ipheral feature but a sizeable proportion of contemporary economies. This is the case not only in
developing economies (ILO, 2011, 2012, 2013; Rani, Belser, Oelz, & Ranjbar, 2013) but also
across the post-Soviet economies, including the Baltic states (Kukk & Staehr, 2014; Meriküll
& Staehr, 2010; Morris & Polese, 2013; Putniņš & Sauka, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015;
Sauka & Putniṇš, 2011; Williams, Round, & Rodgers, 2013) as well as the higher income
OECD nations (Schneider, 2013). As Putniņš and Sauka (2014) reveal, for example, in 2013,
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the Latvian shadow economy was the equivalent of 23.8% of GDP whilst in Estonia and Lithua-
nia it was 15.7% and 15.3% of GDP, respectively. The result is not only signiﬁcant public revenue
losses but just as importantly, poorer quality working conditions, lower levels of welfare pro-
vision due to resource allocation distortions, reduced overall labour productivity and output,
and unfair competition for legitimate businesses which puts pressure on them to evade regulatory
standards (Andrews, Caldera Sanchez, & Johansson, 2011; Cunska, Ketels, Paalzow, & Vanags,
2013; ILO, 2014; Ordóñez, 2014; Putniņš & Sauka, 2014; TUC, 2008).
To explain this shadow economy in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as
well as beyond, the intention of this paper is to evaluate the relationship between the shadow
economy and tax morale. In this paper, tax morale, deﬁned as the intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009; Torgler, 2007), is viewed
through the lens of institutional theory as a measure of the gap that exists between the codiﬁed
laws and regulations of formal institutions (which we here term ‘state morality’) and the unwritten
socially shared rules of informal institutions (which we here term ‘civic morality’). The prop-
osition in this paper is that participation in the shadow economy is more likely the lower is the
tax morale (i.e. the greater the gap between state morality and civic morality). This is asserted
to apply at both the individual, population group and country levels. Thus, if, for example, due
to a lack of trust in government, the norms, values and beliefs of the informal institutions (i.e.
‘civic morality’) do not align with the codiﬁed laws and regulations of the formal institutions
(i.e. ‘state morality’), the assertion is that there is a higher likelihood of participation in the
shadow economy. Conversely, if civic morality is wholly aligned with state morality, the prop-
osition is that there is little likelihood of participation in the shadow economy. The aim of this
paper, therefore, is to evaluate the validity of this tax morale explanation for the prevalence of
the shadow economy and to discuss the consequences for how the shadow economy is tackled.
As will be revealed, a policy approach that seeks to reduce the asymmetry between state morality
and civic morality necessitates a very different approach to that currently adopted by governments
in these Baltic countries and beyond.
In the ﬁrst section therefore, the previous explanations for the prevalence of the shadow
economy will be brieﬂy reviewed along with how a tax morale approach grounded in institutional
theory provides a new lens for doing so. To evaluate the proposition that the likelihood of parti-
cipating in the shadow economy is greater with lower tax morale (i.e. the greater the asymmetry
between state morality and civic morality), the third section then introduces the methodology and
data used to do so, namely a logistic regression analysis of the association between the level of
tax morale and the participation in the shadow economy using a 2013 survey involving 3036
face-to-face interviews in the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The fourth
section then presents the results followed in the ﬁfth section by a discussion of the theoretical
and policy implications before the sixth and ﬁnal section summarizes the ﬁndings.
Before commencing however, the shadow economy needs to be deﬁned. In this paper, the
working deﬁnition adopted, and reﬂecting the widespread consensus, is that the shadow
economy is comprised of paid activities not declared to the authorities for tax, social security
and/or labour law purposes when they should be but which are otherwise legal in all respects
(European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2012; Schneider, 2008; Schneider & Williams, 2013).
The only illegal component of activities in the shadow economy therefore, are that they are
not declared for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when they should be. If paid
activities differ in other respects to the declared economy, which is paid work declared to the auth-
orities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes, then these activities are not here deﬁned
as part of the shadow economy. For example, if paid activities involve the exchange of illegal
goods and/or services (e.g. illegal drugs), then these activities are not here deﬁned as part of
the shadow economy but rather are part of the wider ‘criminal’ economy (Schneider & Williams,
82 C.C. Williams and I.A. Horodnic
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2013; Williams, 2004). Akin to all deﬁnitions nevertheless, there are fuzzy edges, such as whether
activities which are paid in the form of gifts or reciprocal labour rather than money should be
included. In this paper however, only paid activities are included in the deﬁnition of the
shadow economy.
Explaining the shadow economy: a tax morale approach
Over the past decade or so, a number of studies have shown that the size of the shadow economy
is not evenly distributed but rather, varies across not only global regions (ILO, 2013),
cross-nationally (Putniņš & Sauka, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; Schneider, 2013; Schneider & Wil-
liams, 2013; Williams, 2014b, 2014c, 2015) and locally and regionally (Kesteloot &Meert, 1999;
Williams &Windebank, 2001), but also according to various socio-demographic and socio-econ-
omic variables such as gender (ILO, 2013; Leonard, 1994, 1998; Stănculescu, 2005), age (Ped-
ersen, 2003), employment status (Brill, 2011; Leonard, 1994; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013) and
income level (Barbour & Llanes, 2013; Williams, 2004). The consequence has been that a
more contextualized understanding has emerged which recognizes how the shadow economy
can be large and growing in some populations, but smaller and declining in others (Pfau-Efﬁnger,
2009; Putniņš & Sauka, 2014, 2015; Sepulveda & Syrett, 2007; Williams, 2013, 2014b, 2014c,
2014d).
To explain the varying prevalence of the shadow economy, and as Williams (2014b) high-
lights, most studies adopt one of three competing theoretical perspectives. Firstly, there is ‘mod-
ernization’ theory which explains the prevalence of the shadow economy in terms of the lack of
economic development and modernization of state bureaucracies, secondly, ‘neo-liberal’ theory
which explains the shadow economy as resulting from high taxes and over-burdensome rules
and regulations which hinder the free operation of the market mechanism, and third and
ﬁnally, there is ‘political economy’ theory which conversely explains the shadow economy as
resulting from inadequate state intervention and a lack of safeguards for workers. The problem
with these approaches however, is that they focus upon country-level conditions and, with the
exception of the neo-liberal approach, do not explain why some individuals participate in the
shadow economy and others do not.
In recent years however, a ‘tax morale’ approach has begun to emerge that explains the
shadow economy to result from low tax morale, by which is usually meant a low intrinsic motiv-
ation to pay taxes (Alm & Torgler, 2006, 2011; Cannari & D’Alessio, 2007; Clotfelter, 1983;
Cummings et al., 2009; McKerchar, Bloomquist, & Pope, 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler &
Schneider, 2007). To examine tax morale, the extent to which it is deemed acceptable to
engage in shadow work is examined. Our argument in this paper is that it is in effect measuring
the extent to which people disagree with the codiﬁed laws and regulations of the government.
That is to say, tax morale is here interpreted through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol &
Blinder, 2008; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). Viewing institutions as the cognitive,
normative and regulative structures that give meaning to social behaviour (Scott, 1995), insti-
tutional theory portrays all societies as having both formal institutions (i.e. codiﬁed regulations
and laws) and informal institutions which are the ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that
are created, communicated and enforced outside of ofﬁcially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). In this paper, the codiﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions
are viewed as representing ‘state morality’, whilst the unwritten socially shared rules of informal
institutions are seen as representing ‘civic morality’. Seen through this institutionalist lens, tax
morale is a direct measure of the level of acceptability of engaging in shadow work and this is
a tentative proxy measure of the degree of institutional asymmetry. When state morality and
civic morality are aligned, and consequently the codiﬁed laws and regulations are in symmetry
Baltic Journal of Economics 83
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with the norms, values and beliefs of citizens, then the shadow economy will not prevail.
However, when the socially shared norms, values and beliefs of citizens are not in symmetry
with the formal rules, such as when there is a lack of trust in government, then state morality
and civic morality will not align and the proposition of this paper is that there will be a greater
likelihood to engage in shadow economy.
To evaluate this proposition that the lower is the tax morale (i.e. the less aligned is state mor-
ality and civic morality), the greater is the propensity to participate in the shadow economy, the
following hypothesis can be tested at both the societal, population group and individual levels:
Tax morale hypothesis: the greater is the asymmetry between state morality and civic morality (i.e. the
lower is the tax morale), the greater is the likelihood to participate in the shadow economy.
If the shadow economy is more prevalent in populations with lower tax morale, it is important to
identify the populations who possess low tax morale, not least so that they can be targeted by
policy-makers seeking to reduce the size of the shadow economy. Until now, the tax morale lit-
erature has conducted exploratory analyses of a range of variables to examine their inﬂuence. This
has included a range of socio-demographic and socio-economic variables such as age, gender,
education level, employment status, income level, marital status, social class and religiosity
(Alm & Torgler, 2006; Cannari & D’Alessio, 2007; D’Arcy, 2011; Daude & Melguizo, 2010;
Daude, Gutiérrez, & Melguizo, 2013; Giachi, 2014; Kanniainen & Pääkkönen, 2010; Kastlunger,
Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013; Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010; Martinez-Vazquez &
Torgler, 2009; Russo, 2013; Torgler, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Torgler & Schneider, 2007; Wil-
liams & Martinez, 2014). The ﬁnding across a range of different contexts is that tax morale is
lower among men, single people, the unemployed and self-employed, and increases with religi-
osity, age, perceived social status and income but is negatively related to years spent in formal
education. This tax morale literature has also identiﬁed a strong correlation between the level
of tax morale and the prevalence of the shadow economy (Alm & Torgler, 2006; Halla, 2010;
Richardson, 2006; Torgler, 2005a, 2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2009). Here, therefore, a study
is reported that evaluates this tax morale hypothesis in the Baltic nations.
Methodology
To analyse the relationship between the likelihood to engage in the shadow economy and tax
morale, data are reported from special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which involved 3036
face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In each of these
three Baltic countries, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was employed.
This ensured that for each country, the sample was representative of the population in terms of
gender, age, region and locality size. For the univariate analysis in consequence, the sample
weighting scheme is used, as recommended in both the wider literature (Sharon & Liu, 1994;
Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2013; Winship & Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer method-
ology, in order to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis nevertheless,
a debate exists over whether to use a weighting scheme (Pfeffermann, 1993; Sharon & Liu, 1994;
Solon et al., 2013; Winship & Radbill, 1994). Reﬂecting the majoritarian view, the decision has
been taken not to do so.
The face-to-face interviews adopted a gradual approach towards the more sensitive questions.
Firstly, therefore, participants were asked attitudinal questions regarding their views on the
acceptability of engaging in the shadow economy, followed by questions on whether participants
had purchased goods and services from the shadow economy and participated in shadow work.
Here, the focus is ﬁrstly, upon the attitudinal questions to examine the level of tax morale across
84 C.C. Williams and I.A. Horodnic
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individuals, population groups and countries and secondly, the questions on their supply of
shadow work.
To identify the level of their tax morale, participants’ responses were analysed to the six atti-
tudinal questions asked in this Eurobarometer survey regarding how they rate the acceptability of
various types of shadow work on a 10-point Likert scale (where 1 means absolutely unacceptable
and 10 means absolutely acceptable). These six questions in the Eurobarometer survey are in fact
standard questions directly taken from previous surveys such as the International Social Survey
(Torgler, 2005a), the World Values Survey (Alm & Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2006), the European
Values Surveys (Hug & Spõrri, 2011; Lago Peñas & Lago Peñas, 2010), the British Social Atti-
tudes Survey (Orviska & Hudson, 2002), the Latinbarometro (Torgler, 2005b) and the Afroba-
rometer (Cummings et al., 2009). These questions, therefore, are the standard questions
usually used to rate the level of tax morale. They are:
(1) an individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment
received to the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared;
(2) a ﬁrm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the
tax or social security authorities;
(3) a ﬁrm is hired by another ﬁrm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or
social security authorities;
(4) a ﬁrm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her are not ofﬁcially
declared;
(5) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement and
(6) someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income.
Collating responses to these six questions by examining the mean score across these six beha-
viours, with no weighting, an aggregate ‘tax morale index’ is constructed for each individual, as
follows:
Tax morale indexi = 1n
∑n
i=1
xi,
where n = 6, represents the number of questions, i is the individual, xi is the value corresponding
to each question rated by the individual i.
Then, the tax morale index is constructed at aggregate level, for each population group and
country, as follows:
Tax morale indexj = 1N
∑N
i=1
tax morale indexij,
where N is the number of individuals in the respective group/country, j is the group/country,
tax morale indexij is the mean score across the six behaviours for each individual i in the
group/country j.
The index has been represented here in the 10-point Likert scale original format. The lower the
index value, the higher is the tax morale. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefﬁcient of the scale is 0.845
which shows a good internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000).
To analyse the tax morale hypothesis, the dependent variable is the participation in the shadow
economy. As the dependent variable is a dummy with recorded values for persons’ answers to the
Baltic Journal of Economics 85
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question ‘Have you yourself carried out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months?’, we
employed logistic regressions. The logistic cumulative distribution function, which results in the
estimated probabilities lying within the interval [0;1] takes the form:
Pi = E(Yi = 1|Xi) = F(Zi) = 11+ e− Zi , (1)
where
Zi = b0 +
∑
bjxij. (2)
In this paper Yi = 1 if a person responded yes to the question above (i.e. is engaged in undeclared
paid activities); Yi = 0 if a person responded otherwise to the mentioned question (i.e. is not
engaged in undeclared work). Xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim) is the vector of explanatory variables for
the classes of predictors or continuous variables of the respondent i, and b0,b1, . . . ,bm are par-
ameters to be estimated using maximum likelihood method.
To analyse the hypothesis regarding whether the likelihood of participation in shadow
economy is higher with lower tax morale, we used the tax morale index in relation with the depen-
dent variable which measures the engagement in the shadow economy, namely:
. Participation in the shadow economy: a dummy variable with recorded value 1 for persons
who answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Have you yourself carried out any undeclared paid
activities in the last 12 months?’ and recorded value 0 otherwise.
Given the problems in asking participants such a sensitive question and ensuring that honest
responses were given, several techniques were employed. On the one hand, the deﬁnition of the
shadow economy was given prior to asking this question so as to avoid participants deﬁning the
shadow economy in different ways. This asserted that the shadow economy refers to activities
which are not or not fully reported to the tax or social security authorities and where the
person who acquired the good or service was aware of this. On the other hand, social desirability
bias was reduced by ﬁrstly, putting this more sensitive question later after building rapport with
the interviewer, secondly, using a ‘face-saving’ technique which framed the question as non-jud-
gementally as possible by stating before asking the question that this type of activity is relatively
common and acceptable within social norms, thus helping to ‘legitimise’ admission to participat-
ing in such activity and thirdly, by giving repeated reassurances of anonymity, reminding respon-
dents of the commitment to conﬁdentiality.
Indeed, examining interviewers’ responses regarding the perceived reliability of the inter-
views, there is some reason to assume that participants were honest about their shadow work.
In 88% of cases, interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation, in 10% fair cooperation
and in only 2% bad cooperation. Nonetheless, it is probably best to remain cautious about
these estimates of participation and to treat them as lower bound estimates.
To select population groups for analysis meanwhile, the socio-demographic, socio-economic
and spatial independent variables identiﬁed as important in the previous studies of shadow
economy reviewed above are investigated (for details see Table A1). These are:
. Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for men and 0 for women.
. Age: a numerical variable for the exact age of the respondent.
. Social class: a categorical variable for the participant’s perception regarding the social class
to which they belong with value 1 for the working class of society, value 2 for the middle
class and value 3 for the upper class.
86 C.C. Williams and I.A. Horodnic
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. Employment: a dummy variable with value 1 for employed respondents and 0 for unem-
ployed respondents.
. Area respondent lives: a categorical variable for the area in which the participant lives with
value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small, middle- or large-sized town.
. Country: a categorical variable for the country where the respondent lives with value 1 for
Estonia, value 2 for Latvia and value 3 for Lithuania.
To analyse the tax morale hypothesis, and given the nonparametric nature of the data, ﬁrstly, a
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test is used to evaluate whether the median tax
morale index of those engaging in the shadow economy signiﬁcantly differs to the median score
of those not engaging in the shadow economy, whilst secondly, a Spearman’s bivariate correlation
is used to evaluate whether a statistically signiﬁcant relationship exists between cross-national
variations in tax morale and cross-national variations in the prevalence of the shadow
economy. To evaluate whether the hypotheses remains valid when a range of individual-level
variables are introduced, a logistic regression analysis is provided.
Findings
The mean of the tax morale index for the individuals living in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
regarding the acceptability of participating in the shadow economy is 3.35 (where 1 is totally
unacceptable and 10 totally acceptable). The codiﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions
(state morality) and the norms, values and beliefs of the informal institutions (civic morality)
therefore, are not wholly aligned (i.e. the tax morale score is not 1.00).
Nevertheless, the social acceptability of participating in shadow work varies according to the
type of shadow work considered. As Figure 1 reveals, although just 33.5% of the population of
these three Baltic states ﬁnd it highly unacceptable for an individual to engage in shadow work for
a private household, 62.8% ﬁnd it highly unacceptable for a ﬁrm to do shadow work for a private
household, 73.3% for a ﬁrm to do shadow work for another ﬁrm, 66.2% for a ﬁrm to hire a worker
on a shadow basis and 63.4% for someone to partially or completely conceal their income. Some
Figure 1. Acceptability of different types of shadow work in Baltic States, % of respondents.
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75.6% however, deem it highly unacceptable for somebody to claim welfare payments without
entitlement, such as when they are working in the shadow economy but claiming beneﬁts. The
populations of these three Baltic countries therefore, see some types of shadow work as more
(un)acceptable than others. Indeed, 31.4% of the population of these three Baltic countries
view an individual engaging in shadow work for a private household as highly acceptable
whereas less than 10% deem any other form of shadow work to be highly acceptable. This is
also the case for other European nations as found, for example, in Bulgaria (Williams, Franic,
& Dzhekova, 2014).
Figure 2 reveals the mean tax morale index for each of these types of shadow work for the
three Baltic states as a whole, as well as for each individual country (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania). The ﬁnding is that the population of these three Baltic states deem it more unaccep-
table for ﬁrms than individuals to operate in the shadow economy (except for claiming welfare
payments without entitlement). The mean tax morale index for a ﬁrm doing shadow work for a
household is 3.22 and 3.04 for a ﬁrm hiring a shadow worker, and is even lower (2.59) for
ﬁrms doing shadow work for another ﬁrm (i.e. the lower the score, the more unacceptable is
the activity). However, they are more tolerant of individuals participating in the shadow
economy. The acceptability of a person partially or completely concealing their income is 3.17
and 5.35 for a person who engages in shadow work for a household. The exception is those claim-
ing beneﬁts without entitlement, such as whilst working in the shadow economy. This is the most
unacceptable of all behaviours, scoring 2.46. One possible explanation is that this is because such
individuals are viewed as ‘taking our money’, when the unemployed falsely claim social security
beneﬁt, rather than seeking to ‘keep their own money’, as is more commonly perceived to be the
case when the self-employed seek to avoid paying their taxes (Cook, 1997). Similar patterns
regarding the relative social acceptability of these different types of shadow work are replicated
in each of the three Baltic nations, although Latvia has slightly lower overall tax morale, followed
by Lithuania, whilst Estonia has the highest tax morale of all three Baltic states. The same patterns
regarding the relative social acceptability of the different types of shadow work are also replicated
Figure 2. Acceptability of different types of shadow work, a comparison of average scores for Baltic States
and EU28.
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across the 28 member states of the European Union (EU28), although the level of tax morale is
higher (2.35) than in these three Baltic countries (3.35). Similar patterns were identiﬁed in a pre-
vious study of an East European country, namely Bulgaria (Williams et al., 2014).
In order to examine whether a relationship exists between tax morale and the prevalence of the
shadow economy, Table 1 reports the level of tax morale and the extent of participation in the
shadow economy for all individual variables analysed, as well as for the Baltic countries of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Examining how tax morale is related to participation in the shadow economy, this reveals that
those who participated in the shadow economy over the past 12 months have a lower level of tax
morale (4.86) than those who did not (3.17), where 1 means that it is totally unacceptable to
engage in shadow work and 10 means that it is totally acceptable. Turning to how tax morale
varies across the socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables considered, moreover,
the ﬁnding is that men, younger age groups, those who self-classify themselves as belonging to
Table 1. Tax morale and participation in the shadow economy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: by
population group and country.
N = 3036
Tax morality index
(where 1 = totally
unacceptable and 10 =
totally acceptable)
% Engaged
in shadow
economy
% Of all
population
engaged in
shadow
economy
% Of all
population
€ Earned in
shadow
economy
(mean)
EU28 2.35 4 – – 723
All Baltic
nations
3.35 9 100 100 659
Shadow work
Yes 4.86 – – 9 –
No 3.17 – – 91 –
Gender
Men 3.60 13 65 46 782
Female 3.15 6 35 54 435
Age
15–24 3.53 11 23 19 445
25–34 3.53 13 28 19 1078
35–44 3.60 10 16 14 566
45–54 3.57 10 20 18 407
55–64 2.99 6 8 13 848
65+ 2.72 3 5 17 155
Social class
Working class 3.49 10 58 51 500
Middle class 3.21 8 40 47 863
Higher class 2.75 11 2 2 418
Employment
Employed 3.42 11 59 49 604
Unemployed 3.29 7 41 51 745
Area
Rural/village 3.65 10 34 30 535
Small/middle/
large town
3.23 9 66 70 723
Country
Latvia 3.98 11 34 28 478
Lithuania 3.16 8 45 54 696
Estonia 2.96 11 21 18 885
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lower social classes, the employed and those living in rural areas have a lower tax morale than
women, older age groups, those self-deﬁning themselves as in a higher class, the unemployed
and those living in urban areas. The same trends are identiﬁed when examining participation
in the shadow economy. Those groups with lower tax morale are also those displaying higher par-
ticipation rates in the shadow economy. The only exceptions are those self-deﬁning themselves as
the upper classes, who despite having higher tax morale display a higher participation rate in the
shadow economy.
The tentative ﬁnding therefore, is that populations with lower tax morale are more likely to
participate in the shadow economy. Indeed, this is tentatively supported by a Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum test which reveals that those participating in the shadow economy have a lower tax
morale with a median tax morale index score of 5 compared with a median of 3 for those parti-
cipating the shadow economy (where 1 = totally unacceptable and 10 = totally acceptable across
six tax non-compliance behaviours) (see Table A2).
Turning to the cross-national variations, Table 1 also reveals that the level of tax morale is not
the same across these Baltic nations. The level of tax morale (i.e. the adherence of the population
to the codiﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions) is lowest in Latvia (3.98) and Lithuania
(3.16) whilst civic morality is better aligned with state morality in Estonia (2.96). At ﬁrst glance,
this does not appear to be related to participation in the shadow economy. Although those living in
Latvia, where tax morale is lowest, represent 28% of the surveyed population but 34% of those
surveyed who work in the shadow economy, the opposite is the case of Lithuania, which consti-
tutes 54% of population surveyed but just 45% of those participating in the shadow economy. To
evaluate whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between cross-national variations in tax morale
and cross-national variations in the prevalence of the shadow economy, therefore, a Spearman’s
bivariate analysis is conducted at the EU28 level. This reveals a statistically signiﬁcant associ-
ation (p < .001***). The lower the tax morale in a country, the greater is the prevalence of the
shadow economy. Therefore, tax morale appears to be signiﬁcantly associated with the prevalence
of the shadow economy at not only the individual but also the societal level.
To determine whether this association remains signiﬁcant when other characteristics are taken
into account and held constant, Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis. Model
1 examines whether this correlation remains signiﬁcant when purely individual-level character-
istics are added, and model 2 adds the country in which the respondent lives. The ﬁnding is
that there is a strong association between tax morale and the shadow economy. The greater the
tax morale index (i.e. the tax morale worsens) the greater the likelihood to engage in undeclared
work. This further validates the tax morale hypothesis.
Identifying the populations with a greater likelihood to engage in undeclared work, Model 1
reveals that when other individual-level factors are held constant, men have a greater likelihood to
engage in undeclared work compared with women, employed people compared with unemployed
people and so to the younger people. Model 2, meanwhile, which adds the country variable,
reveals that although the same socio-demographic and socio-economic trends continue to
prevail, the additional ﬁnding is that those living in Latvia and Lithuania have signiﬁcantly
smaller likelihood to engage in undeclared work compared with those living in Estonia. There-
fore, model two shows that, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics and also for
tax morale, the individuals in Estonia are more likely to engage in undeclared work.
Discussion and policy implications
Evaluating the tax morale hypothesis, the above analysis displays a strong association between
tax morale and the shadow economy. As tax morale worsens, the likelihood of participating in
the shadow economy increases. This is the case at the individual, population group and
90 C.C. Williams and I.A. Horodnic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ha
lla
ms
hir
e H
os
pit
al]
 at
 06
:08
 26
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
country levels and remains strongly signiﬁcant when other individual-level variables are intro-
duced and held constant. In consequence, the lower is tax morale, the greater the likelihood to
engage in the shadow economy. The tax morale hypothesis (i.e. that the prevalence of the
shadow economy will be greater in populations with lower levels of tax morale) is thus positively
conﬁrmed.
This analysis therefore, not only validates the tax morale explanation for the prevalence of
the shadow economy but also reveals the need for a change in how the shadow economy is
tackled. In these Baltic countries, the approach of governments until now has been to use
direct controls to ensure that the cost of being caught and punished outweighs the pay-off
from participating in the shadow economy (see Dekker, Oranje, Renooy, Rosing, & Williams,
2010; Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a). This has been achieved by increasing the actual and
perceived risks and costs associated with participation (see Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), such
as increasing workplace inspections, although recently greater attention has started to be
paid to making participation in the declared economy easier and more beneﬁcial (Williams,
2014a).
The ﬁnding that the shadow economy is strongly associated with tax morale however,
suggests the need for a change in approach. The shadow economy in these Baltic countries
arises out of the lack of alignment of state morality and civic morality, with the prevalence of
the shadow economy increasing as the degree of asymmetry increases. This applies both at the
individual, population group and country level. To tackle the shadow economy, in consequence,
a reduction in the degree of asymmetry between state morality and civic morality is required.
To identify how such an improvement in tax morale might be achieved, lessons can be learned
from management practice at the organizational level where the search to align employees norms,
Table 2. Logistic regression of participation in shadow economy model.
Dependent variable: engagement in shadow work
(undeclared paid activities) Model 1 Model 2
Tax morale index 0.324*** (0.0309) 0.346*** (0.0328)
Gender (women)
Men 0.730*** (0.146) 0.745*** (0.147)
Age (exact age) −0.0213*** (0.00444) −0.0217*** (0.00448)
Social class (working class)
Middle class −0.218 (0.149) −0.233 (0.149)
Higher class 0.624 (0.523) 0.571 (0.523)
Employment (unemployed)
Employed 0.325** (0.149) 0.307** (0.150)
Area (rural/village)
Small/middle/large town −0.0721 (0.154) −0.0324 (0.156)
Country (Estonia)
Latvia −0.472***(0.176)
Lithuania −0.632***(0.189)
Constant −3.026*** (0.291) −2.746***(0.307)
N 2471 2471
Pseudo R2 0.1203 0.1282
Log likelihood −698.68955 −692.43562
χ2 178.01 184.09
p> 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: All coefﬁcients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. The tax morale index used in the
regression is calculated at individual level. Signiﬁcant at *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 (robust standard errors in
parentheses).
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values and beliefs with the mission and vision of the organization have led to a shift from ‘hard’ to
‘soft’ human resource management (HRM), and from bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic manage-
ment (Legge, 1995; Thompson & Alvesson, 2005; Watson, 2003). Table 3 provides a useful
summary of the two approaches. In the direct controls approach (alternatively termed ‘hard’
HRM or bureaucratic management), organizations seeking to elicit behaviour change amongst
the workforce pursue compliance via close supervision and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed
procedures and centralized structures within the context of a low commitment, low trust and
adversarial culture. In the indirect controls approach (‘soft’ HRM or post-bureaucratic manage-
ment) meanwhile, organizations elicit behaviour change using loose rules, ﬂexible procedures
and decentralized structures in the context of a high commitment, high trust culture of mutual
interest.
The argument here is that to reduce institutional asymmetry and align state morality with civic
morality, such an indirect controls approach could be scaled-up from the organizational level to
the ‘societal-level’. To improve tax morale therefore, the argument is that not only do the norms,
values and beliefs of the informal institutions (civic morality) need to change but also, impor-
tantly, the formal institutions (state morality).
To change civic morality in order that it aligns with state morality, at least two policy initiat-
ives might be pursued in these Baltic countries. Firstly, citizen education regarding the beneﬁts of
paying taxes is required. As the inscription over the entrance to the Internal Revenue Service in
Washington, DC states, ‘Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society.’ Engendering commitment
to paying taxes therefore requires citizen education about the beneﬁts of doing so. At present,
governments have not seen this as a core concern when tackling the shadow economy. An
example of good practice in this regard is ‘SMARTS – a game for those who are in education’
organized by the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia that sought to educate younger
people about the beneﬁts of paying tax (Karnite, 2013). Secondly, advertising campaigns are
also required informing citizens of the costs of operating in the shadow economy and beneﬁts
of the declared economy. In these Baltic countries, and as the above analysis reveals, these cam-
paigns could be targeted at men, younger age groups and those living in rural areas, who all have
relatively low levels of tax morale compared with other societal groups. An information campaign
in 2010 and 2011 in Estonia, ‘Unpaid Taxes Will Leave a Mark,’ whose main message was inter-
preted to be that the maintenance of the state is the responsibility of all citizens, is an example of
good practice. Some 65% of the people surveyed about this campaign asserted that the commer-
cial increased awareness of unpaid taxes (Nurmela, 2013).
Improving tax morale nevertheless, does not solely entail changing civic morality. Formal
institutions must also change if tax morale is to be improved. This is essential since in the
Baltic states rules and regulations are more often than not borrowed or even directly imposed
Table 3. Direct and indirect control approaches in work organizations.
Direct control approaches Indirect control approaches
Close supervision and monitoring of activities Empowerment and discretion applied to activities
Tight rules Loose rules
Highly prescribed procedures Flexible procedures
Centralized structures Decentralized structures
Low commitment culture High commitment culture
Low trust culture High trust culture
Adversarial culture Culture of mutual interest
A tightly bureaucratic structure and culture A loosely bureaucratic structure and culture
Source: Derived from Watson (2003, Table 5.2).
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from outside the society rather than derived from existing socially accepted or internally discussed
practices. To address this, a modernization of governance is needed. This necessitates at least
three process reforms with regard to formal institutions. Firstly, procedural justice must be
enhanced, which refers to treating citizens in an impartial, respectful and responsible manner.
This requires a shift from a ‘cops and robbers’ approach and towards a service-oriented culture
(Leventhal, 1980; Murphy, 2005). Secondly, procedural fairness must be improved which
refers to citizens believing that they pay their fair share compared with others (Molero &
Pujol, 2012) and thirdly, redistributive justice must be enhanced which relates to citizens
feeling they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes they pay (Kirchgässner,
2010).
If these policy initiatives are pursued to change both the formal and informal institutions, then
as Luttmer and Singhai (2014) assert, this would change the ﬁve mechanisms through which tax
morale operates, namely: their intrinsic motivations to pay taxes; reciprocity where the motivation
for paying taxes depends on a person’s relationship to the state (i.e. their willingness to pay taxes
depends on the public goods provided by the state); peer effects and social inﬂuences, where will-
ingness to pay or not to pay taxes is inﬂuenced by peer group opinions; the long-run cultural
factors that affect the willingness to pay taxes; and information imperfections and deviations
from utility maximization.
Conclusions
To explain the prevalence of the shadow economy, this paper has evaluated the relationship
between the shadow economy and tax morale. Viewing tax morale through the lens of insti-
tutional theory as a measure of the symmetry between the codiﬁed laws and regulations of
formal institutions (state morality) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions
(civic morality), the proposition has been tested that the lower the tax morale (i.e. the greater the
asymmetry between state morality and civic morality), the greater is the likelihood to participate
in the shadow economy. This has been positively conﬁrmed both at the individual, population
group and country level. Therefore, akin to a previous study which revealed how formal employ-
ees in formal jobs in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland accepting an undeclared (‘envelope’)
wage from their formal employer in addition to their declared salary have lower tax morale than
those who do not (Williams & Horodnic, 2015), this paper ﬁnds that the lower the tax morale, the
more likely is participation in the shadow economy (i.e. paid activities not declared to the auth-
orities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes).
To reduce the prevalence of the shadow economy, therefore, a policy shift has been advocated
away from the use of direct controls to detect and punish those participating in the shadow
economy and towards fostering a high trust high commitment culture where civic morality
aligns with state morality. On the one hand, this requires improvements in tax morale using edu-
cation and awareness raising measures regarding the beneﬁts of paying taxes. On the other hand, it
also requires changes in formal institutions so as to improve trust in government by developing
greater procedural justice, procedural fairness and redistributive justice, in order to improve tax
morale and reduce participation in the shadow economy.
In sum, this paper has tentatively conﬁrmed a tax morale explanation for the shadow economy
grounded in institutional theory. This is an explanation and method that could be now applied to
countries other than the Baltic states. Indeed, whether this tax morale approach is valid when
explaining and tackling the shadow economy in other European and global regions and countries
now needs to be evaluated. If this paper therefore stimulates such evaluations, it will have
achieved one of its objectives. If governments start viewing the shadow economy as resulting
from lower tax morale, and begin discussing policy measures for improving such morale,
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rather than persisting with the detection and punishment of those participating in the shadow
economy, then this paper will have achieved its wider intention.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics.
Variables Deﬁnition Mode or mean
Min/
Max
Shadow work
(dependent
variable)
Dummy variable of shadow work (undeclared
paid activities) carried out in the last 12
months
No shadow work
(90.47%)
0/1
Tax Morale Index Constructed index of self-reported tolerance
towards shadow work
3.35 1/10
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (54.40%) 0/1
Age Respondent age (exact age) 44 years 15/96
Social class Respondent perception regarding social class to
which it belongs in categories
Working class of
society (51.10%)
1/3
Employment Dummy for the employment status of the
respondent
Unemployed (50.92%) 0/1
Area respondent lives Size of the area where the respondent lives in
categories
Small or middle sized
town (38.03%)
1/3
Country Respondent country in categories Lithuania (54.17%) 1/3
Source: Eurobarometer 79.2 (2013): Undeclared Work in the European Union.
Table A2. Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test.
Obs. Rank sum Expected
People not engaged in undeclared work 2338 2,896,301.5 3,027,710
People engaged in undeclared work 251 456,453.5 325,045
Combined 2589 3,352,755 3,352,755
Unadjusted variance 1.267e+08
Adjustment for ties −3,829,809.5
Adjusted variance 1.228e+08
Ho: Tax morale index of people not engaged in undeclared work = Tax morale index of people engaged in
undeclared work
z =−11.857
Prob>|z| = 0.0000
Notes: Tax morality median of people not engaged in undeclared work: 3; tax morality median of people engaged in
undeclared work: 5.
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